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A B S T R A C T
Rapid urbanization has brought the needs to minimize negative transport externalities in cities to the forefront. The development of metros is a response to urban
sustainability challenges, but the construction of underground infrastructure often requires massive excavation and long construction time, disrupts the economy and
people’s everyday living, and is highly capital intensive. As such, these multi-billion-dollar investment decisions require political vision and determination, careful
traﬃc analysis, and the ability to raise suﬃcient funds to cover not only capital construction costs but also future operations and depreciation. Underground
infrastructure projects must, therefore, balance the engineering aspects of a proposed project with the development of a resilient and sustainable business model. This
paper is the ﬁrst to develop a comparative longitudinal analysis of the ﬁnance and funding models of two underground systems (London Underground and Hong
Kong’s Mass Transit Railway) with a focus on the development of a conceptual framework for understanding land value capture (LVC) based on diﬀerential rents and
ﬁnancialization. The focus is on exploring the supply-side aspects of underground transport infrastructure including ﬁnance or capital investment and the re-
lationship with funding or revenue streams and the creation of ﬁnancially sustainable business models.
1. Introduction
Population growth has led to an increase in the intensity and density
of urban living (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Aﬀairs, 2014). This is transforming cities and accentuating the im-
portance of underground transport infrastructure, especially under-
ground railways or metros. The development of metros is a response to
road traﬃc congestion, various transport negative externalities (no-
tably carbon emissions noise and particulate matter), land shortages
and the escalating value of urban land (Loo and Banister, 2016; Loo,
2018). The construction of underground infrastructure, however, often
requires massive excavation and long construction time, disrupts the
economy and people’s everyday living, and is highly capital intensive.
As such, cities reaching a certain stage of population and income size
(Loo and Cheng, 2010; Loo and Li, 2006) are often confronted with the
critical but diﬃcult decision to build a metro or to invest in other forms
of transport infrastructure. These multi-billion-dollar investment deci-
sions (versus small-scale local infrastructure, see Bryson et al, 2018)
require political vision and determination, careful traﬃc analysis, and
the ability to raise suﬃcient funds to cover not only the capital con-
struction costs but also future operations and depreciation costs for
long-term maintenance. Underground infrastructure projects must,
therefore, balance the engineering aspects of a proposed project with
the development of a resilient and sustainable business model.
With reference to underground railways or metros, what were some
of the more successful business models? What lessons can we learnt
from these examples? The public ﬁnancing (upfront capital costs) and
funding (revenue) of infrastructure reﬂects ﬁnance and funding con-
ventions that have been established at a particular time and place.
These conventions alter as new ﬁnancing models are created over time.
Guided by this historical perspective and the above research questions,
this paper develops a comparative longitudinal analysis of the ﬁnance
and funding models of two underground systems: the London
Underground and Hong Kong’s Mass Transit Railway (MTR). The focus
is on exploring the supply-side aspects of underground transport in-
frastructure including ﬁnance or capital investment and the relation-
ship with funding or revenue streams and the creation of ﬁnancially
sustainable business models. There are a number of on-going debates
here including the ﬁnancialization of urban land by private capital
(Torrance, 2009; Theurillat et al., 2016) and alternative approaches to
ﬁnancing infrastructure including land value capture (LVC) (Bryson
et al., 2017). Our focus is on understanding LVC’s contribution to de-
veloping ﬁnancially sustainable underground infrastructure business
models that try to develop a balance between revenue ﬂows and capital
investment. LVC is a ﬁnancial tool designed to monetise the escalation in
land values in the catchment area of public infrastructure projects. Infra-
structure projects increase the accessibility and connectively of land
and this is reﬂected in the value of land around key access points to a
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transport network. Thus, underground infrastructure investments have
two returns. First, a direct return measured by time saved in travelling
between places reﬂecting the use and policy values of infrastructure
projects. Second, indirect impacts that alter the value of land providing
beneﬁts to those not directly involved in ﬁnancing or funding infra-
structure investment. LVC tries to capture some of the latter as a con-
tribution to the ﬁnance and funding of public sector infrastructure
projects. There is an on-going debate on LVC, for example, Du and
Mulley (2007) could identify no short-run impacts from a metro ex-
tension in Sunderland, UK, while Pagliara and Papa (2011) found that
rail development increased land values in Naples in Italy.
Most existing studies focused on above ground rail infrastructure
(including light rails) while the role played by LVC in ﬁnancing and
funding underground projects remains largely unknown (see a review
Mohammad et al., 2013). Given the diverse geographical contexts, a
longitudinal and comparative approach is needed. This paper’s research
design is a comparative longitudinal case study. The comparative
analysis of London Underground and the MTR aims to highlight the
impacts of diﬀerent histories on the funding/ﬁnancing of these under-
ground systems. The methodology involved identifying and analysing
primary and secondary published and unpublished sources including
policy documents and reviews. A triangulation approach was used to
develop the two case studies. The paper is divided into ﬁve sections.
After this introduction, the second section reviews the literature on the
ﬁnancing of underground railways to develop a new conceptual ap-
proach for exploring LVC developed from the urban rent theory. The
third section explores ﬁnance and funding and the evolution of the
London underground; and the fourth section develops the analysis of
the MTR. The ﬁnal section is a discussion and conclusion that compares
and contrasts the ﬁnancing and funding of these very diﬀerent under-
ground systems.
2. Land value capture, diﬀerential rent and ﬁnancialization of
railway infrastructure
A distinctive feature of cities lies in their high infrastructural in-
tensity. Railways, undergrounds, roads, airports and commercial
buildings provide the infrastructure for the circulation of people, but
also rely on ﬁnancial infrastructure in which capital is temporarily
‘ﬁxed’ into the built environment. With a typical life span of 50 years or
above, the diﬃculty is that the returns on transport infrastructure occur
over a very long-time period. Moreover, the returns on any infra-
structure investment are complex and are not just ﬁnancial. This ex-
plains the role public sector ﬁnancing plays in infrastructure develop-
ment. More recently, the application of cost-beneﬁt analysis to mega-
transport infrastructure, such as airports, highlighted the wider social
and environmental impacts of such investments (Li and Loo, 2016).
Kaliampakos et al. (2016) reviewed the costs and beneﬁts of modern
undergrounds in diﬀerent countries including social and environmental
externalities. They highlighted that underground solutions resulted in
more eﬃcient infrastructure usage, improved urban transportation ca-
pacity and increased resilience. Such wider positive beneﬁts may be
considered as justiﬁcations for the application of public subsidy.
An on-going debate in the social sciences has identiﬁed a prevailing
trend since the 1970s of ‘ﬁnancialization’. This process has many dif-
ferent deﬁnitions, but the term highlights the increasing importance of
ﬁnancial motives, markets and ﬁnancial intermediaries in shaping
economies and decision-making (Epstein, 2005). Much of this debate
explores the ways in which various intermediary actors (developers,
property consultants and property investors) ‘perform the various
translations required for anchoring ﬁnancial capital in the city’
(Theurillat, et al., 2016: 1510). This debate has highlighted that:
‘The shift of responsibility for essential urban services into the hands
of global ﬁnancial institutions has created infrastructure assets that
may be in diﬀerent cities, countries and continents but that may be
more linked through similar internal rates of return objectives, risk
management and reﬁnancing strategies, and ultimately, stable,
predictable types of returns for the investors that own the assets’
(Torrance, 2009: 818)
This is very much an over-generalisation as the analysis must
highlight which urban services are implicated in this process and in
which countries. There must also be an analysis of strategies that are
intended to mediate some of the adverse impacts of ﬁnancialization
(Bryson et al., 2017). In addition, the debate on ﬁnancialization has a
tendency to focus on ﬁnancial capital and particular types of ﬁnancial
instrument, whilst ignoring land tenure and some of the earlier litera-
ture on urban rent, global ﬁnance and property development and in-
vestment (Bryson, 1997; Haila, 2016).
Rent is, by its very nature a social relationship; it is both an in-
strument and a concept and these change over time. The theory of
urban rent has its origins in the third volume of Capital (Marx, 1984)
and rent in this analysis was paid for the right to use a piece of land
with some ‘interest on ﬁxed capital’ which is ‘incorporated in the land,
which may constitute an addition to ground-rent’ (Marx, 1984: 622).
Marx distinguished between two types of rent. First, absolute rent results
from the ability of landowners to charge rent for land, irrespective of its
location or fertility. It is the minimum payment required in return for
the use of a unit of land. Secondly, diﬀerential rent results from diﬀer-
ences in the rates of proﬁt obtainable from land that possesses unequal
capacities including connectivity (Bryson, 1997: 1445). There are two
types of diﬀerential rent. Diﬀerential rent I is a ‘function of the ad-
vantages oﬀered by the site of a property, and which do not depend on
any action by the owner’ (Larmarche, 1976: 100). This includes public
sector infrastructural investment that transforms a land plot’s re-
lationship to other plots in some way by enhancing accessibility. Dif-
ferential rent II is derived from diﬀerences in the production methods
applied to a plot of land; this form of rent comes from the advantages
contained within the curtilage of a plot, for example the development
on a plot of a 20 storey oﬃce building compared to 10 storey building.
The application of development ﬁnance to a plot results in an addition
to diﬀerential rent II whereas an escalation in diﬀerential rent I is di-
rectly linked to investments in surrounding plots made by other land
owners and public and private sector infrastructure investments, for
example in light rail and underground transport.
This is the ﬁrst paper to identify and develop the relationship be-
tween LVC and urban rent theory. We argue that the application of
urban rent theory to infrastructure investments provides a conceptual
framework for exploring the ﬁnance and funding of underground rail-
ways based on LVC. The focus is on diﬀerential rent I and the eﬀect on
the value of adjacent plots. These eﬀects are unearned as they do not
reﬂect any investment by the owners of plots that are adjacent to or
within the impact reach of beneﬁts that result from investments that
create the diﬀerential rent in the ﬁrst place. It is possible to argue that
any uplift in the value of a plot’s diﬀerential rent I reﬂects, to some
extent, some type of compensation to property owners aﬀected by
disruptions associated with major infrastructural investments. It is im-
portant that the focus of any analysis of LVC not only explores the re-
lationships between these two types of rent – I and II, but also begins to
unravel the complexity of the former. Thus, we argue that diﬀerential
rent I should be conceptually further divided into two sub-types. First,
diﬀerential rent Ia results from infrastructural investments that enhance
connectivity and accessibility. These investments are planned by the
public sector and may be ﬁnanced and funded by the public and/or
private sector. It is these impacts that represent LVC uplift. Second,
diﬀerential rent Ib comes from investments in adjacent plots that are
often undertaken by the private sector but that inﬂuence the value of
adjacent plots. This means that the value of a plot is calculated by using
the following equation:
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+ +
+ =
AbsoluteRent Differential Rent Ia Differential Rent Ib
Differential Rent II Plot Value
In this conceptual framework, diﬀerential rent Ia results from in-
frastructure investments that may be implicated in some type of LVC
mechanism. There are two ways in which the uplift in diﬀerential rent
Ia can be captured by the public sector. First, by direct involvement in
the property development and investment process. In this approach,
some type of development vehicle is established either by the public
sector working by itself or in partnership with private sector interests.
Second, by an indirect process involving some type of taxation on any
uplift in the rental value of sites adjacent to and eﬀected by a public
sector infrastructural investment. The majority of LVC mechanisms are
based on the former mechanism. The latter is technically and politically
diﬃcult as diﬀerential rent Ia uplifts are unearned, unplanned and
perhaps unexpected and this raises issues regarding adjacent land-
owners and the politics of taxation of unearned beneﬁts and their
measurement.
It is worth noting that the calculation of diﬀerential rent II is rela-
tively simple as this reﬂects the actual or projected rental income from
a plot combined with the expected or required yield (Bryson, 1997).
This type of rent is not about land values, but the additional value that
results from investment on a plot. The value of the land is determined
by diﬀerential rent Ia & b combined with market forces – supply and
demand. The exact amounts of diﬀerential rent Ia and Ib are much
harder to calculate, and any calculation depends on a set of assumptions
regarding relative value over time and the impact and reach of any
infrastructural investments combined with the impacts of any invest-
ments on other adjacent plots. Cost-beneﬁt analysis facilitates the
identiﬁcation of the wider social and economic beneﬁts of infra-
structural investment (Li and Loo, 2016), but only some of these im-
pacts are reﬂected in diﬀerential rent Ia. There is a political question
regarding how much of this additional indirect value can be captured
by the public sector?
LVC is an old method for ﬁnancing infrastructure investment.
Recently, LVC has become a ﬁnancing and funding technique that has
been explored and (re)applied by cities including London, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Atlanta, San Francisco and Kansas City (Transport for
London, 2017). In other words, the ﬁnancing and funding of local in-
frastructure represents a major upfront capital investment which im-
pacts both on diﬀerential rent I and II. These impacts usually beneﬁt
private rather than public sector interests and often they are subjected
to ﬁnancialization as global ﬁnance is anchored in cities through the
application of ﬁnance to land as part of a process of land and property
speculation and investment. The wider impacts of infrastructural in-
vestment have important social, economic and ﬁnancial consequences.
However, there is still a lack of systematic analysis of these diﬀerent
approaches to ﬁnancing and funding underground transport infra-
structure in diﬀerent contexts. It is to this analysis that we now turn our
attention.
3. Financing London’s underground
The London Underground has an old history of LVC but has only
recently returned to exploring the ﬁnancial model of capturing diﬀer-
ential rent Ia and Ib as a mechanism for furthering the development and
maintenance of London’s transport infrastructure. In the early decades
of the nineteenth century, London was transformed from a busy com-
mercial centre into the world’s largest city. This transformation was
associated with major capital infrastructure investments. The ﬁrst
London underground line, the Metropolitan line, was opened in London
between Paddington and Farringdon in 1863. The history of the London
underground was dominated by diﬃculties in accessing ﬁnance for
capital investment. This was a continual problem. The underground had
been built and run by private sector companies who had great diﬃ-
culties attracting investment and in running the system for proﬁt. Yet,
the Metropolitan Underground Line survived as a separate company until
the creation of London Transport in 1933. This survival was based on
the Line’s ability to exploit its land resources around its stations. The
Metropolitan promoted housing estates adjacent to the railway under
the “Metro-land” brand with nine housing estates constructed near its
stations. The Metropolitan obtained two Acts of Parliament during the
1880s which separated its land bank from the railway company.
Usually, in the UK railway companies were not permitted to develop
surplus land and the land had to be sold on to development interests.
The Metropolitan acquired the rights to grant building leases and to sell
ground rents, but also to develop its own housing estates (Halliday,
2001: 182). This included extensive developments in London’s suburbs.
In 1925 a retail development was constructed with 180 ﬂats above
Baker Street station with capital costs of £500,000 for an annual rental
income of £40,000; a higher return on capital than could be made from
running the railway line.
There is an important historic paradox at the centre of the re-
lationship between London’s underground and funding (revenue) and
private sector ﬁnance (capital). The paradox was that London
Underground had failed to earn a reasonable rate of return on capital
invested by the private sector. Part of the problem was a conﬂict be-
tween people wanting to live in low-density estates in outer London and
the population density required to support investment in an under-
ground station. In 1920, it was argued by Albert Ashﬁeld, chairman of
the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) (1933–1947), that:
‘either the circuit covered by a station must be rendered wider or the
traﬃc denser by some means; cheap auxiliary forms of transport
such as the motor omnibus may be developed to concentrate traﬃc
on the railway stations … A measure of coordination among the
transport facilities in a district is thus unavoidable for success’
(Ashﬁeld, 1924: 4).
This analysis was correct to highlight the disparity between funding
and ﬁnance but ignored the wider ﬁnancial and social impacts of in-
vestment in railways. The business case for ﬁnancing an underground
ideally should capture some of the values resulting from escalation in
the value of land that accrues from increasing connectivity, accessibility
and density. Accessibility, thus, not only increases density impacting on
the value of diﬀerential rent Ia & b and vice versa, but also encourages
owners to invest to increase diﬀerential rent II. Nonetheless, these va-
lues were not then captured for supporting the underground.
In 1933, London Transport was established as a public body with
commercial and social responsibilities to regulate London’s infra-
structure including ﬁnancing and to develop a more integrated infra-
structure system. In the late 1940s the UK’s main line railways were
nationalised, and their reconstruction was given priority over the
maintenance of the Underground and most of the unﬁnished plans of
the pre-war New Works Programme were shelved or postponed with
the exception of the development of the Victoria line (opened 1968)
and the Jubilee Line (opened 1979). Both the Victoria and Jubilee lines
were the ﬁrst to be subjected to a rigorous economic analysis. In the UK,
cost-beneﬁt analysis was initially applied to transport projects with the
development of the M1 motorway followed by the Victoria line in 1963
(Foster and Beesley, 1963; Beesley and Foster, 1965). This analysis
included time saved by passengers, including road users and the savings
from reduced bus services. The initial calculation was that the Victoria
line would generate an operating surplus of £250,000/year but that this
would not cover the interest charges on capital costs of over £50million
(Halliday, 2001: 182). Nevertheless, between 1950 and 1997 the Un-
derground experienced a period of ﬁnancial deprivation. Nevertheless,
after the Kings Cross ﬁre disaster in 1987 there was an inﬂux of capital
which saw stations upgraded, and the busiest stations expanded.
During the 1990s ﬁnance and funding remained a continual pro-
blem. Consequently, the then Conservative government (1990–1997)
sought to employ Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) to facilitate the de-
livery of large-scale capital projects that it could not aﬀord immediately
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(Horne, 2004: 78). The Underground would identify the projects and
the PFI partner would design, deliver and operate the facility for an
agreed time period and with a scale of usage charges (Horne, 2009: 76).
This had the advantage of employing private rather than public capital,
allowing projects to be delivered sooner and at lower risk of late de-
livery, though ultimately the costs were likely to be higher than using
public ﬁnancing (Horne, 2009: p.76). The Labour government that
came into oﬃce in 1997 embraced the concept of private capital on an
even larger scale relabelling this as a Public-Private Partnership (PPP).
The Treasury decided to transfer all London Underground infrastructure
and rolling stock to three privately owned companies on 30-year con-
tracts; this left London Underground operational staﬀ employed by the
public sector but with privately ‘owned’ assets and privately managed
engineering and maintenance staﬀ (Horne, 2004: p.78). The PPP ap-
proach increased costs and also complexity. The private sector com-
panies would ﬁnance the substantial investment needed to overhaul the
ageing underground and in turn would receive performance-related
service charges (Horne, 2004: 78).
In 1999, before control was passed to Transport for London (TfL),
London Underground was divided into two parts so that a pub-
lic–private partnership (PPP) arrangement could be established;
London Underground remained a public company responsible for op-
erations while private companies were responsible for upgrading the
railway. TfL was created in 2000 as the integrated body responsible for
London's transport system. TfL is constituted as a statutory corporation
regulated under local government ﬁnance rules. TfL is now ﬁnanced
and funded in four main ways: (1) fares income – this is the largest
single source of income; (2) other income, including advertising in-
come, property rental and income from London’s road traﬃc
Congestion Charge; (3) grant funding from the Department for
Transport (DfT) and Greater London Authority (GLA), and Crossrail
funding; (4) borrowing and cash movements. As of 2017, £5 bn is raised
from ticketing each year from the underground, bus and rail (Coﬀ,
2017) and £1 bn annually from non-fares including property, retail and
advertising (Coﬀ, 2017). TfL has a capital programme (excluding
Crossrail) which averages £2 bn annual project expenditure: upgrading
roads, buses, Tube trains and infrastructure, i.e. tracks and stations
(Coﬀ, 2017). TfL has stated a need to achieve breakeven on their Op-
erating Surplus by 2021/22 (Coﬀ, 2017). They will not increase fares as
they are committed to providing aﬀordable transport for all, but there is
no central government grant available (Coﬀ, 2017).
In 2010, the experiment with PPP ended when TfL acquired the last
remaining PPP contractor, Tube Lines, for £310million. One of the
ways in which TfL is seeking to increase revenue is through LVC using a
similar strategy to that developed by the Metropolitan Line in the
nineteenth century. The core opportunities for LVC have come from line
extensions and station refurbishments. Previous examples of LVC in
London include the White City scheme which used land occupied by the
White City depot, the former Underground staﬀ and training school and
Central power station and the old Wood Lane station platforms and
street buildings (Bruce and Croome, 2006: 80). London Underground
owns the freehold to the 40-acre White City development site. This
£1.5 billion project included new shops, housing, parking space and a
transport interchange (Bruce and Croome, 2006: 80). Demolition
started in 2003 and the shopping centre opened in 2008 and was the
largest covered shopping development in London. In an expansion to
this project, more than 30 unused railway arches in White City were
transformed into a diverse mix of commercial, leisure and retail space.
Transport for London’s plan for the arches, near Wood Lane Tube sta-
tion, incorporated new cycle parking and pedestrian passageways im-
proving connectivity in the neighbourhood. This is a simple case of LVC
based on a contractual partnership between TfL and the property de-
veloper. One element of this scheme included the construction of a new
Hammersmith & City line station with the development partner,
Westﬁeld, contributing £170m to transport improvements. Thus, in this
example TfL gained from ‘direct land value capture’ with a share in the
development proﬁt and the uplift in land values and ground rent that
results from an increase in diﬀerential rent Ia but also beneﬁted from
developers investing to enhance diﬀerential rent II. Thus, the LVC
equation was as follows:
+
= +
TfL Created Differential Rent Ia Developer Created Differential Rent II
LVC Developer Profit Share Escalation in Ground Rent( )
In addition, TfL beneﬁted from additional demand from passengers.
KPMG and Savills’ research for TfL (2017) (using transactions data
from the Land Registry and local controls for background price inﬂation
and local place eﬀects) identiﬁed that past projects such as the Jubilee
line extension (JLE), the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) extension to
Woolwich and the upgrade and incorporation of the North London line
into the Overground network have produced signiﬁcant land value
uplifts, of 52%, 23% and six per cent respectively, relative to controls.
The methodology is diﬃcult and based on assumptions regarding
comparative property values. Thus, the Savills’ approach applied the
‘diﬀerence in diﬀerence’ method which explores variations in property
prices over time between ‘treatment groups’ and ‘control groups’ (TfL,
2017: 21). The analysis for TfL used control groups of properties within
a one to two-kilometre ring of property transactions. A key challenge is
the selection of the control properties and diﬀerentiating between the
direct and indirect impacts of infrastructure improvements from other
possible impacts. There is thus a problem with causality and diﬀer-
entiating between diﬀerential rent Ia and Ib and controlling for other
factors that impact on property values. These other factors include non-
ﬁnancial impacts related to fashion and alterations in the perceived
desirability of streets and properties. The TfL analysis identiﬁed that for
the Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) values within the zones of inﬂuence
initially grew much faster than the control areas, before falling back in
line with the control areas. Over the last two years of construction,
value growth within the zones of underground inﬂuence accelerated,
leading to a transport premium of approximately 30 percent when the
JLE opened in November 1999 (TfL, 2017). The values within the JLE
zones of inﬂuence grew faster than the control areas for the ﬁve years
after the JLE opened, allowing for some volatility.
The LVC Final Report (TfL, 2017), commissioned jointly by the
Mayor of London and TfL, which was published in 2017 and based on
research by KPMG and Savills, identiﬁed that eight prospective TfL
projects costing £36 bn, including Crossrail 2 and the Bakerloo line
extension (BLE), could generate a land value uplift of £87 bn. The
problem is that existing value capture mechanisms extract only a small
fraction of land value gains from transport investment, in an ad hoc and
poorly targeted manner. These mechanisms include: business rates on
commercial premises; Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) on the transfer of
land or property (although this accrues to central rather than local
government); over-station development; and development taxes such as
the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) and negotiated developer
contributions. Governments in the past have attempted to improve the
ability to capture land value uplifts mainly by targeting new develop-
ments, and arguably using relatively blunt approaches including high
tax rates. Improvements in data, technology and research methods now
increasingly enable cities to isolate transport-induced value uplifts
(diﬀerential rent Ia) in a more intelligent, targeted and potentially more
proportionate manner. But, this is a relatively simple process when it
involves contractual relationships over speciﬁc plots between a public-
sector provider of infrastructure and private sector development in-
terests. In this case, LVC can be directly negotiated and agreed based on
an allocation of risks, rewards and ownership and access to assets. It is
much more diﬃcult to apply LVC to plots that have beneﬁted from
metro investments that are not in a contractual relationship with the
infrastructural investor. In these cases of indirect LVC, a clear and
transparent mechanism for identifying LVC impacts that result from any
escalation in diﬀerential rent Ia is required.
A number of LVC options have been identiﬁed by TfL (2017), but
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the ‘transport premium charge’ proposed oﬀers the most equitable and,
according to TfL’s analysis, most ﬁnancially signiﬁcant model for ﬁ-
nancing transport investment. Such a charge could capture a proportion
of the premium paid to landowners by new purchasers or tenants of
residential property for access to new transport facilities. This reﬂects
the proposed introduction of a form of indirect capture of the uplifts
that can be attributed to diﬀerential rent Ia. This would create a novel
mechanism to capture transport-induced value uplift that cannot cur-
rently be captured by the existing property tax system and has the
potential to be an eﬀective mechanism for ﬁnancing new infrastructure
(particularly schemes that could expand the supply of housing). The
charge would mean that those who received the greatest beneﬁts from
improved transport links – ﬁrms and residents around the new or up-
graded station – would pay more than others. The charge would be paid
by existing and incoming businesses, while current residents would be
exempt. According to TfL (2017) this charge could potentially generate
between £13 bn and £28 bn of funding across eight sample TfL projects.
This charge would go some way to capturing diﬀerential rent Ia uplifts,
but it does not represent a complete calculation of these unpaid for
beneﬁts. Thus, this is a proxy measure and is really a form of land-based
hypothecated taxation applied to ﬁnance and fund linked infra-
structural investments. This approach reﬂects the diﬃculties of iden-
tifying and measuring the relationship between an infrastructure in-
vestment and any resultant diﬀerential rent Ia uplifts.
Transport for London’s (TfL) new Elizabeth line, also known as the
Crossrail I project is expected to increase rail capacity in the city by
10%. With 118 km of new track and 10 new stations, total construction
costs were estimated at almost £15 billion. The Elizabeth line opens in
December 2018. Crossrail funding of £216m in 2017/18 ﬁnanced the
project to build the infrastructure for the Elizabeth line. TfL has im-
plemented a variety of LVC mechanisms including betterment charges
for commercial properties (the Crossrail Business Rate Supplements),
development charges for developers (the Community Infrastructure
Levy), land sales and developer contributions in lieu of development
charges (as was the case with Canary Warf station). While there is no
clear evidence so far of Crossrail eﬀecting the values of existing re-
sidential stock, there is evidence that it has produced uplifts on com-
mercial property (around 1–2.5 per cent per annum relative to con-
trols), and in enabling new residential development (with a 50%
increase in density of new housing within 500m of a Crossrail station
compared to areas further away) (TfL, 2017).
A further, example of LVC is the Northern line extension (NLE) to
Battersea which will improve transport links and public spaces in the
area and is essential to support the transformation of Vauxhall, Nine
Elms and Battersea, a designated regeneration area on the South Bank.
The extension is set to open in 2020 and up to 25,000 jobs and 20,000
new homes could be created. Journey times from Nine Elms or
Battersea to the West End or the City will, in some cases, be less than
15min. An independent report on the economic impact of the NLE has
shown it could generate substantial beneﬁts to the area. The extension
is a partially privately funded project based on direct land value capture
from the site developers, SP Setia and Sime Darby, with contributions
from other sources such as the new US Embassy. Similarly, TfL intends
to fund a signiﬁcant portion of the Bakerloo line extension into South
East London through housing development around stations. A Tax
Increment Financing (TIF) (Bryson et al., 2017) arrangement was also
agreed to provide additional funding for the Northern Line Extension.
The Greater London Authority (GLA) took out a loan of up to £1 billion
to fund the project, with a repayment guarantee provided by the UK
government. Loan repayments are expected to be repaid, in part,
through future growth in business rates revenue within the Nine Elms
Enterprise Zone. A TIF mechanism is either an alternative to a LVC
approach or is complementary.
Savills (in TfL, 2017) using evidence from the academic literature,
the London case studies and speciﬁc development potential studies
estimated, at an order of magnitude, the scale of uplift that might be
produced by a sample of potential future TfL LVC projects. This in-
cluded both the capitalisation of user beneﬁts into land and property
values (diﬀerential rent Ia), as well as any planning gains arising out of
new developments (diﬀerential rent II) (Table 1). There is no direct
relationship between the estimated cost of an infrastructure enhance-
ment and land value uplift. For instance, Crossrail 2 (a proposed rail
route in South East England) and the Bakerloo line extension are clearly
premised on capacity and accessibility improvements, which should
lead to large land value diﬀerential rent Ia uplifts on adjacent plots, and
in line with a project such as the JLE. The A13 tunnel or the decking
scheme at Poplar will produce relatively modest transport improve-
ments but they release more land for development, which presents the
opportunity for value creation in the surrounding area as a result of
‘placemaking’ (TfL, 2017) and enhancement the value of diﬀerential
rent Ia. An analysis of individual projects reveals some clear diﬀerences.
Projects such as Crossrail 2 and the BLE produce the majority of their
land value uplifts – all diﬀerential rent Ia – from the capitalisation of
user beneﬁts into residential property prices, with Crossrail 2 (but not
the BLE) generating material uplifts also from commercial property
(TfL, 2017). In contrast, projects such as the DLR extension, Poplar and
the A13 tunnel produce their impacts largely by catalysing new de-
velopment opportunities.
London Underground’s attempt to apply LVC reﬂects the long his-
tory of this transport infrastructure. Decisions made in the past trans-
ferred land and development rights to the private sector undermining
the Underground’s ability to develop a sustainable ﬁnancial model. The
development of London Underground’s approach to LVC reﬂects the
accumulation of contractual lock-in brought about by decisions made
when the underground lines were planned, developed and nationalised.
The consequence is that for this underground a mixed economy of ﬁ-
nancing and funding is emerging that blends diﬀerent approaches based
on an accumulation of decisions made since 1863. Retroﬁtting LVC to
an existing underground system has meant that, for London, limited
LVC will be acquired and any gains will be relatively marginal and
predominantly associated with the development of new lines and line
extensions. The problem is that the majority of diﬀerential rent Ia
Table 1
Potential future transport for london land value capture projects.
Source: Savills analysis for TfL; value uplift over 30-year period from FY19 to FY48 (base case) (in TfL, 2017). Net present value in ﬁnancial year 2016/17 prices, £bn.
Scheme Type Estimated cost Value uplift on existing stock Value uplift on new development Total land value uplift Uplift as % of cost
Crossrail 2 New rail line 27.5 47.8 13.1 60.9 221%
Bakerloo line extension Rail line extension 3.3 11 7.1 18.1 548%
Crossrail I extension Rail line extension 1.8 2.4 1.8 4.2 233%
Old Oak Regeneration 0.9 1.7 1.2 2.9 322%
DLR Extension Rail line extension 0.4 0.013 0.4 0.4 103%
Poplar Regeneration 1.3 0 0.2 0.2 15%
A13 Regeneration/tunnel 0.8 0 0.2 0.2 25%
Camden Town Station Station upgrade 0.2 0.045 0.003 0.048 24%
Total (rounded) 36 63 24 87 242%
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uplifts from infrastructural investments have already been realised by
private landowners as a consequence of investments made in the distant
past. LVC is being applied in a relatively ad hoc manner reﬂecting the
contractual position of each line or station. To be eﬀective LVC must be
incorporated into the development ﬁnancial model of an underground
rather than retroﬁtted. This was the position for the Hong Kong metro.
We now turn to the analysis of this underground system to explore a
metro in which LVC played a central role in the provision of ﬁnance and
funding from the initial development of the infrastructure.
4. Financing Hong Kong’s Mass transit railway
Hong Kong is densely populated with more than 7million people
living in a city of 1,100 square kilometres. In 1967, a study was un-
dertaken by the Hong Kong Government to identify solutions to road
congestion. In response, the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) was estab-
lished as a public entity in 1975. MTR was solely owned by the Hong
Kong government during the 1980s to 1990s. In 2000, 23% of its shares
were sold to private investors with the government retaining 77%
(Sharma and Newman, 2017). This restructuring aimed at enhancing
the eﬃciency, competitiveness and proﬁtability of MTR (Wong, 2015).
Since then, the company’s innovative ﬁnancing and funding model has
led to a proﬁt-making transit operation with a revenue of HK
$45.2 billion in 2016 and a net proﬁt of HK$9.4 billion (MTR Annual
Report, 2016). As of 2017, MTR has 221 km of rail with 155 stations
including 89 railway stations and 68 light rail stops. On average, in July
2017 the MTR carried 4.74million passengers per day and accounted
for 43.5% of daily passenger journeys by public transport (MTR
Monthly Traﬃc and Transport Digest, 2017).1 The operating cost per
passenger in Hong Kong was $0.61 US dollars while revenue per pas-
senger was $0.96. The MTR is unusual as it does not rely on government
subsidies (World Bank, 2001). During 1980–2005, Cervero and
Murakami (2009) estimated that the Hong Kong government’s majority
share in MTR generated HK$140 billion net ﬁnancial returns. This is
based on the diﬀerence between earned income of HK171.8 billion from
land premiums, market capitalisation, shareholder cash dividends and
initial public oﬀer proceeds, and the value of government injected
equity capital HK$32.2 billion. The fare box ratio which describes the
ratio between fares collected and operational costs in Hong Kong was
1.56. This high fare box ratio is achieved in part by Hong Kong’s dense
population and part by the eﬃciency and reliability of the underground
system (Wong, 2015). Tang at al. (2018) highlighted the positive im-
pacts of Hong Kong MTR in terms of improvements in urban transport
accessibility, enhancing overall societal eﬃciency via a special in-
stitutional arrangement, and stabilising property prices during eco-
nomic downturns.
In Hong Kong all land in the territory is owned by the government,
but development rights are sold to private developers through public
auctions. The ‘rail-cum-property’ model developed to ﬁnance and fund
the MTR is diﬀerent from London. At the initial stage of planning a
railway line, the MTR conducts a feasibility study to calculate project
costs, patronage, revenue and to identify potential property develop-
ment opportunities that will result from any uplift in diﬀerential rent Ia.
The government then assesses the proposed lines and routes, and MTR
develops a development plan including services to build schools and
hospitals (Enoch, 2002). MTR then negotiates development rights
(often for a period of 50 years, sometimes 70 years) that allow it to
develop properties above railway stations, depots and adjacent land
(Hung, 2014; Verougstraete and Zeng, 2014). The government grants
these development rights exclusively to MTR, so that MTR does not
have to purchase land from the open market. The development rights
are granted at a full market value before the establishment of the new
rail line (i.e. the ‘before-rail’ market price). The MTR receives no other
government subsidiaries (Tiry, 2003). This means that the MTR busi-
ness model is based on the realization of diﬀerential rent Ia & Ib and
diﬀerential rent II.
MTR prepares a public bidding process to divide the development
rights into more manageable projects and allocate them to private
property developers who will bear construction and commercial risks
(Verougstraete and Zeng, 2014). Under the land leasing conditions,
MTR enters into partnerships with property developers selected from a
list of qualiﬁed bidders based on full market value including the
transport premium, or escalation in diﬀerential rent Ia, associated with
the new line (i.e. the ‘after-rail’ market price). The price diﬀerence
between the ‘before rail’ and ‘after rail’ is often substantial – diﬀerential
rent Ia – and can cover all development costs, such as land premiums,
construction costs and relevant enabling works and marketing. The full
control of the land remains with MTR because it does not sell the de-
velopment rights to private developers (Suzuki et al., 2015). The de-
velopers construct buildings and sell them acquiring uplifts in the value
of sites that accrue from diﬀerential rent Ia and II. The diﬀerential rent
equation is as follows:
+
=
+
MTR Created Differential Rent Ia Developer Created Differential Rent II
LVC MTR Developer Profit Share Development Gain and Rental Income
Future Profits by MTR Retaining Development Rights
( ( )
)
Around
20–25% of the developers’ proﬁts are acquired by the MTR and any
losses are covered by the developers (Enoch, 2002); MTR ﬁnancing
comes from the proﬁt share.
MTR is responsible for aligning multiple shareholder interests in
diﬀerent project phases. It prepares development plans, connects all
interfaces between railway stations and properties, enforces technical
control standards, deals with land tenders, liaises between the gov-
ernment and property developers, monitors development quality and
property sales and manages properties after completion (Suzuki et al.,
2015). The ‘rail-cum-property’ model is based on capturing an MTR
share of any uplift from diﬀerential rent Ia enabling MTR to plan and
integrate diﬀerent phases of its railway and property development
plans to ensure eﬀective implementation, minimize delays and reduce
transaction costs (Sharma and Newman, 2017).
When selecting property developers, MTR often negotiates for its
share of development proﬁts from the sale or leasing of properties and
the sharing of assets in-kind. Through this process, MTR not only
beneﬁts from up-front payments generated from development rights but
also receives a share of future revenue and development proﬁt (Cervero
and Murakami, 2009) – including that accruing from diﬀerential rent II.
The terms of the direct LVC proﬁt allocation model between MTR and
private developers is agreed by negotiation. For residential properties,
MTR receives an agreed proportion of any proﬁt generated from
property sales when a private developer sells units before the con-
tractual deadline. After this deadline, MTR can decide to sell or lease
any unsold units. For commercial properties such as shops and oﬃces,
MTR obtains proﬁt from leasing to developers or retaining parts of these
assets to obtain long-term rental income (Enoch et al., 2005;
Verougstraete and Zeng, 2014). Between the establishment of the MTR
in 1975 and 1986, three urban lines were completed: Kwun Tong,
Tsuen Wan and Island. From these three lines, 18 sites were developed,
including 28,000 apartments, 150,500m2 of retail and 128,500m2 of
oﬃce space. MTR manages these developments; and the rental and fees
from managing these properties was HK$697million in 1998 ac-
counting for around 10% of MTR’s revenue in that year (Enoch, 2002).
By capturing part of the land value and property developed around
railway lines via sharing proﬁts with developers, obtaining part of the
ownership of new developments and rent from on-site properties, MTR
generates revenue from operations, maintenance and new projects
(Leong, 2016). This is a very diﬀerent approach to London Under-
ground as LVC, via contractual agreements with developers based on a
direct LVC model, has always been a central element of the MTR’s ﬁ-
nancing/funding strategy. The MTR is directly capitalising on and
1 Available from: https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/
transport.pdf.
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capturing uplifts that accrue from increases in both diﬀerential rent Ia
and diﬀerential rent II, but also any uplifts from diﬀerential rent Ib.
London Underground is trying to copy this approach to ﬁnance the
development of new lines and extensions.
MTR obtains revenue from three sources: (1) fare income from
the core business of providing public transport services; (2) income
from developing and providing other commercial services that are
complementary to railway operations (such as kiosks, advertising,
exhibitions and consultancy services); and (3) income from
property development and management based on the impact of in-
frastructural investments on diﬀerential rent Ia. There are political
diﬃculties with raising fares and this means that MTR is
heavily reliant on non-fare revenue. The second and third income
sources are critical for MTR’s ﬁnancial sustainable as fare revenue
alone does not cover capital depreciation and ﬁnancing costs
(Tang and Lo, 2010a).
During 2012–2016, HK$35 billion of operating proﬁt came from
transportation or 40% of total operating proﬁt (Table 2) and HK
$21.7 billion from commercial businesses in Hong Kong stations. The
property rental and management businesses in Hong Kong was the
third largest source of operating income, accounting for around 19%
of total operating proﬁt (MTR Annual Report, 2016). MTR has the
world’s highest ‘fare box recovery rate’ or the percentage of income
from ticket sales weighted against operating expenses, typically be-
tween 150% and 180% (Wong, 2015). An annual fare adjustment
mechanism was introduced in Hong Kong as early as 2007 and this
was instrumental in ensuring that MTR fares were in line with local
economic conditions, wage levels and the company’s productivity, as
reﬂected in a productivity factor after the merger of the MTR and
KCRC (Transport and Housing Bureau, Transport Department, 2016).
Furthermore, since the 1990s, a co-ordinated approach to transport
and land use planning (generally termed transit-oriented develop-
ment or TOD), with the railways-as-the-backbone transport policy in
Hong Kong, has contributed to high levels of metro patronage
creating a substantial ‘fare box recovery rate’ (Loo et al., 2010; Loo
et al., 2017).
House price premiums were found to be between 5 and 17% for
units built as part of ‘rail-cum-property’ projects (Cervero and
Murakami, 2009). This range highlights the variability in the re-
lationship between infrastructural investment and its impacts on dif-
ferential rent Ia. This variation is explained by distance decay, or reach,
of the impacts of infrastructural investments and the impacts that ac-
crue to the most or least accessible stations in the MTR network. Project
with transit-oriented designs reﬂected by the location of adjacent shops,
high quality pedestrian corridors and open space obtain a premium in
excess of 30%. Choy et al. (2007) identiﬁed that in 1999–2000, on
average properties in the Quarry Bay District within 10-minute walk to
an MTR station had a HK$100,000 price premium. According to JLL,
the investment management ﬁrm, the new Kwun Tong MTR Line ex-
tension in 2016 was expected to lead to an 80% and 95% rise in re-
sidential property values in Ho Man Tin and Whampoa, respectively
(South China Morning Post, 2016).2 The Land Registry’s record shows
that the average sale price of South Horizons ﬂats in Ap Lei Cha in-
creased from HK$13,320 per square foot in January 2016 to HK$17,000
in July 2016. In addition, the government’s conﬁrmation of the de-
velopment plan for the Shatin to Central Link increased the average
price of residential property by 46% per square foot in Kowloon City
district.3 Apart from increased property values which accrue to private
property owners and property developers, part of the LVC can be ob-
tained by the Hong Kong government via properties taxes. Property tax
is charged at a standard rate of 15% of the net assessable value of
properties, which is determined by rent, service charges and fees paid
to the property owner, minus a 20% allowance on the net assessable
value for property repairs and maintenance (Hong Kong Government).4
Another ‘rail-cum-property’ example is the Tung Chung Station on
the Tung Chung Line. This is a transit-oriented development, consisting
predominantly of residential housing with retail, oﬃces and a hotel
adjacent to the station. MTR partnered with property developers who
paid a land premium and development costs to obtain the property
development rights (Suzuki et al., 2015). The two parties worked out a
coordinated design for the development of the railway and adjacent
properties (Cervero and Murakami, 2009). Not only can MTR enjoy the
land premium income (diﬀerential rent Ia & Ib), it also beneﬁts from in-
kind assets and a share in development proﬁts (diﬀerential rent II). In
terms of ownership, the residential towers are sold to and owned by
individual ﬂat owners, while the shopping malls and retail stores, of-
ﬁces and hotels are owned by the property developers, and the public
transport interchanges are owned by the government. MTR manages
the residential towers and obtains management income. Developers
manage malls, oﬃces, town squares; and hotels are managed by hotel
operators. The town square and public transport interchanges are
managed by the delegated operator appointed by the government
(Murakami, 2012). MTR has developed a LVC model based on diﬀer-
ential rent Ia combined with a model based on acquiring proﬁts that
accrue from uplifts that result directly from property development and
investment (diﬀerential rent II) and management fees.
Another project is Maritime Square, which is part of the develop-
ment of Tsing Yi Station. What is special about this case is that it has
been designed to ensure ‘seamless’ integration between the railway
station and the shopping centre enhancing the experience of residents,
passengers, visitors and shoppers. Residents living in the apartments
above the station enjoy ‘weather-free’ conditions as they can shop and
Table 2
MTR operating proﬁt contributions (HK$bn).
Source:MTR Annual Report, 2016.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total %
Hong Kong Transport Operations 6.5 6.7 7 7.2 7.6 35 40
Hong Kong Station Commercial Businesses 3.3 4.1 4.5 4.8 5 21.7 25
Hong Kong Property Rental and Management Businesses 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.7 3.9 16.9 19
Hong Kong Property Development 3.2 1.4 4.2 2.9 0.3 12 14
Mainland of China and International Railway, Property Rental and Management Subsidiaries 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 3.6 4
Other Businesses 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 1
Mainland of China Property Development Subsidiary 0 0 −0.1 −0.1 0.4 0.2 0.23
Project Studies and Business Development Expenses −0.4 −0.5 −0.5 −0.3 −0.4 −2.1 −2
Total Operating Proﬁt 16.1 15.8 19.6 19 17.6 88.1 100
2 Available from: https://www.okay.com/en/property-news/how-will-the-
mtr-south-island-line-aﬀect-the-property-market-in-hong-kong/403#.
WdTe02eQzL8 and http://www.scmp.com/property/hong-kong-china/article/
2039636/mtr-eﬀect-rubs-property-sales-whampoa-and-ho-man-tin.
3 Available from: https://www.okay.com/en/property-news/how-much-will-
upcoming-mtr-developments-inﬂuence-district-property-prices/572#.
WduajGeQzL8.
4 Available from: https://www.gov.hk/en/residents/taxes/property/
propertycompute.htm.
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travel without going outside. The beneﬁts of land integration are
made possible by master planning undertaken by MTR and in-
corporated in to ‘Development Agreements’. In other words, MTR
controlled and supervised the implementation of this master plan
ensuring development quality (Tang et al., 2004; Cervero and
Murakami, 2008). Property developers paid a land premium and de-
velopment costs (Hung, 2014).
Apart from the ‘rail-cum-property’ model, two other models exist to
provide mass transport in Hong Kong. One is the initial subsidy model,
and the other is the concession model. Under an initial subsidy model,
the government ﬁnances part of the initial investment but does not
build it. Private investors provide the rest of the ﬁnance for construc-
tion, and are responsible for the operation and management, on-going
investment and asset upgrades. Hong Kong Disneyland Resort Line
(DRL) is one example. In 2002, MTR estimated that the construction of
the DRL would cost HK$2 billion. However, the project was unable to
achieve an appropriate commercial rate of return and was short of HK
$798million. Other options such as granting property development
rights and equity injection were subject to various restrictions and
therefore were not suitable. After the government had reviewed the
market environment, patronage and market share estimates, cost esti-
mate and MTR’s revenue, it waived HK$798million worth of dividends
between 2002 and 2004 (Legislative Council, 2015).5 Another ﬁnan-
cially unviable project is the West Island Line. The government granted
$12.7 billion towards construction to close the project’s ﬁnancing gap.
It involved extending the existing Island Line from Sheung Wan to
Kennedy Town with two intermediate stations at Sai Ying Pu and the
University of Hong Kong.6 The MTR has a mixed ﬁnance/funding model
that includes government subsidy for currently unviable lines combined
with LVC, property development/investment gains and user charges.
This supports the long history of diﬃculties with the ﬁnancing and
funding of undergrounds; LVC and property gains work in some places,
but more marginal lines require subsidy to close the ﬁnancial viability
gap in the initial investment appraisal.
Under a concession model, the government is responsible for ﬁ-
nancing, building, owning and leasing existing railway lines to MTR.
MTR has to pay rent and is responsible for on-going investment. This
reduces the total investment required and improves MTR’s investment
return. One example is the West Rail in Hong Kong which was directly
ﬁnanced by the government in the form of upfront equity injection. It
was built, owned and operated by Kowloon Canton Railway (KCR) who
acts as an agent for the government to develop properties on top of the
railway station and return a share of the proﬁt to the government. This
reﬂects the creation of a form of special purpose vehicle in which
government directly obtains a share of the uplift resulting from diﬀer-
ential rent Ia and II. The government bears the risks of obtaining a
return on this investment. This line was acquired from KCR by MTR in
2007 under a 50-year lease agreement whereby MTR is in charge of
operations, management and on-going investment (Tang and Lo,
2010b; Kam, 2017). The East Rail Line and Ma On Shan Rail Line are
also operated under this model.
‘Rail Gen 2.0’ was introduced in 2016 as an alternative business
model to develop MTR with a focus on providing better connections and
services. Some of the ‘Rail Gen 2.0’ projects are ﬁnanced by a Green
Bond designed to improve services and environmental performance.
Green bonds are similar to conventional bonds but the exception being
that the proceeds from a green bond are invested in projects with en-
vironmental outcomes. In its simplest form, a bond issuer raises a ﬁxed
amount of capital, and then repays the capital and interest over a
deﬁned time period (United Nations Development Programme)7. The
proceeds from Green Bonds are used to ﬁnance or reﬁnance, in whole or
in part, MTR projects that meet eligibility criteria such as low carbon
transportation, energy eﬃciency improvements, sustainable transit
stations and real estate property development (MTR Green Bond
Report, 2016).8 This bond utilises a new fast-growing bond investor
base providing the same cost eﬀective ﬁnancing as a traditional bond.
MTR issued a debt of US$600million as a10-year Green Bond in No-
vember 2016, generating net proceeds of US$598.05 million. The Green
Bonds attracted investors including asset managers, banks, and in-
surance companies from Asia and Europe. This is one type of ﬁ-
nancialization, but a type that is controlled and coordinated by MTR.
The infrastructural assets continue to be deﬁned by the quality of the
urban service that they provide rather than solely based on ﬁnancial
criteria. The bond provides upfront capital investment which is repaid,
in part or whole, by savings that result from investments which enhance
environmental outcomes. New projects ﬁnanced from this Bond include
the 2.6-kilometre Kwun Tong Line Extension which opened in October
2016. Total investment in the Kwun Tong Line Extension was HK
$6.9 billion, of which HK$1.3 billion (US$167.74million) came from
the Green Bond. This project reduced the journey time between
Whampoa and Yau Ma Tei stations by 15min. It is estimated that
19,000 tons of CO2 emissions would be reduced, apart from other
beneﬁts such as reduced road traﬃc, energy saving and pollution re-
duction.
The expansion of the MTR is based on diﬀerent funding models. For
instance, the West Island Line, owned by MTR, is based on the initial
subsidy model. The government granted MTR HK$400million in 2008.
The Shatin to Central Line applied the concession model with the
government providing the line’s capital costs, and MTR is responsible
for operations, maintenance, asset renewal and replacement. The South
Island Line (East) and Kwun Tong Line Extension used the ‘rail-cum-
property’ model (MTR Annual Report, 2010).
5. Discussion and conclusions
Underground transport infrastructure requires a substantial upfront
capital investment with fare revenue representing a continual long-term
stream of funding that is expected to underwrite development, refurb-
ishment and operational costs. Through the above comparative long-
itudinal analysis, we have examined some of the more successful
business models in London and Hong Kong. Some value lessons about
LVC, diﬀerential rent and ﬁnanalization can be drawn. At the con-
ceptual level, the impacts of transport infrastructure investments are
complex including direct transport impacts on travel times and the
reduction of congestion and indirect impacts related to an escalation in
the value of diﬀerential rent Ia, but also uplifts in diﬀerential rent II
from property investments and from diﬀerential rent Ib. This paper has
developed a new conceptual framework for exploring LVC by applying
and developing an approach based on the urban rent theory. The cal-
culation of LVC is a complex task based on understanding the inter-
relationships and impacts of three diﬀerent types of diﬀerential rent – Ia
& Ib and II. The primary relationship is deﬁned by a new division of
diﬀerential rent I into two sub-types – Ia directly linked to infra-
structural investment and Ib directly linked to investments on adjacent
plots usually by the private sector. This new framework provides an
approach to guide innovations in the measurement or assessment of
LVC. It clearly identiﬁes or allocates the impacts of distinct investments
on plot values highlighting the importance of separating the impacts
that result from diﬀerent types of property-related investments and
5 Available from: http://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/english/
essentials-1415ise15-foregoing-dividends-to-ﬁnance-infrastructure-projects.
htm.
6 Hong Kong’s Information Services Department (2009). Available from:
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200905/26/P200905260179.htm.
7 Available from: http://www.undp.org/content/sdﬁnance/en/home/
solutions/green-bonds.html.
8 Available from: https://www.mtr.com.hk/archive/en/community/MTR_
GreenBondRpt2016_Eng.pdf.
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interventions.
The debate on the ﬁnancialization of infrastructure has argued that
‘Infrastructural assets are deﬁned by institutional investors not
through physical characteristics, such as a bridge or a road, but
through the low-risk and predictable investment return character-
istics’ (Torrance, 2009: 819).
This is all very well, but there is an important omission in the ﬁ-
nancialization debate (Bryson et al., 2017). This omission is a very
simple question – what is being ﬁnancialized? Financialization may
involve infrastructure directly – a bridge – but much is based on the
ﬁnancialization of the impacts of infrastructural investment – diﬀer-
ential rent Ia. The London Underground is an excellent example. TfL is a
public-sector organisation or a collective provider of infrastructure, but
many of the land-based impacts of this collective provision have been
acquired by private actors. Thus, for the London Underground what has
been ﬁnancialised is not the provision of urban services, but some of the
impacts of this provision – in other words, uplifts that are part of dif-
ferential rent Ia and enhanced by investments that impact on diﬀer-
ential rent II and Ib. The on-going debate on ﬁnancialization needs to
pay careful attention to what is being ﬁnancialized and this must in-
clude an analysis of all types of diﬀerential rent and their impacts.
Diﬀerential rent is critical as land and land-based eﬀects are a funda-
mental element in the provision of all types of urban services.
From an investment decision-making perspective, what is apparent
from this comparative analysis is that, for London, decisions made in
the past have meant that many of the indirect ﬁnancial beneﬁts from
investment in the underground have been captured by private property
developers and investors. Thus, public investment in the London
Underground is acting as an invisible subsidy to private ﬁnance and this
reﬂects a long-term process of the ﬁnancialization of land. For Hong
Kong ﬁnancialization of indirect beneﬁts is heavily controlled and
regulated by the government and MTR throughout. The London
Underground is an example of incremental planning with the con-
sequence that the business models supporting this infrastructure are
fragmented as they reﬂect a diversity of diﬀerent types of contractual
relationship. For the MTR there is still a diversity of ﬁnancing business
models, but at the core of each is a concern with monetising any es-
calation in diﬀerential rent Ia and diﬀerential rent II that can be linked
to MTR investments.
Hence, an important lesson is that a direct approach to LVC through
seizing diﬀerential rent Ia and diﬀerential rent II to the underground
development and operations is beneﬁcial. Though the MTR has been
developed using a number of distinct ﬁnancing/funding models, at the
centre of these models is a concern with a direct approach to LVC
through ownership of freeholds and the sharing of development proﬁts
with the private sector. This is an interesting strategy and is one that
provides an alternative approach to the ﬁnancing models explored in
the on-going debate regarding ﬁnancialization and the private and
public sectors. Much of the focus of this literature is on the increased
importance of private sector ﬁnancial motives, markets and institutions
in shaping economies and decisions. The MTR is an example of an al-
ternative type of ﬁnancialization; the government and the MTR is de-
veloping a direct approach to LVC based on ﬁnancial motives and
markets but designed to create societal gains through the ﬁnancing and
funding of local infrastructure. Thus, the MTR has applied ﬁnanciali-
zation to the provision of rail services in Hong Kong by exploiting,
managing, controlling and co-ordinating a direct relationship between
diﬀerential rent Ia and LVC. The MTR is not only an investor in infra-
structure, but also a long-term landowner, property developer, devel-
opment partner, property manager and property investment. This ap-
proach places LVC and ﬁnancialization at the centre of the provision of
rail services in Hong Kong. This is a process in which collective pro-
vision continues but as part of a state managed process of ﬁnanciali-
zation based on exploiting the ﬁnancial gains that result from diﬀer-
ential rent Ia & b and II. For the MTR infrastructure assets are deﬁned
by the services provided and that are ﬁnanced and funding by a mixed
ﬁnancial model based on income streams from providing transport
services, short-term development gains and a share in long-term rental
gains.
In addition, as demonstrated in the MTR case, placing LVC at the
centre of an underground’s business model has clear beneﬁts of helping
to ensure a balance between fare and non-fare revenue. This is critical
for the long-term sustainability of a metro system and can represent a
best-practice approach to LVC. Nonetheless, it also means that the
sustainability of the underground is highly reliant on property-related
transactions and the ability of the metro company to appropriate ﬁ-
nancial value from uplifts in diﬀerential rent Ia that accrue from its
investments in increasing the accessibility of plots and in releasing
development sites. This point is particularly important as illustrated by
the MTR example that some of its development gains come from re-
leasing development sites rather than from any escalation in diﬀerential
rent Ia from infrastructural investments. This means that the metro
company has created a ﬁnancial/funding model based on LVC – one
that captures value from investments that create diﬀerential rent II.
There is a temporal aspect to this ﬁnancial/funding model. Diﬀerential
rent Ia results from an initial infrastructural investment while diﬀer-
ential rent II gains can occur at any time as long as the underground
retains control of the development rights.
In contrast, the London example shows the underground being in-
itially developed and co-ordinated by and for private sector interests
only. The business model was not successful. Subsequent nationalisa-
tion not only led to a dependence on taxation and user fees, but was
also associated with limited investment. More recently, LVC and TIF
based ﬁnancial mechanisms are been explored, but most of the beneﬁts
that have resulted from diﬀerential rent Ia are outside the direct control
of the London Underground. The current proposals under development
by TfL represent an indirect approach to LVC based on attempts to tax
unpaid beneﬁts that accrue from diﬀerential rent 1a combined with
direct LVC in the case of new lines and extensions. The problem is that
TfL no longer owns the land directly linked to the existing underground
lines as much of this is owned by private actors – ﬁnancial institutions
including pension funds. There is an important distinction to be made
here. As a lesson learnt, it is important that the development of new
underground lines and extensions does not decouple the tunnels and
tracks from the land directly aﬀected by the impacts that infrastructure
investment has on enhancing accessibility. This land should be con-
sidered to be a critical asset managed to obtain short-term development
proﬁt combined with a continual rental stream to support the on-going
funding and ﬁnancing of the provision of infrastructure services.
As demonstrated in the London case, a key lesson is the importance
of retaining ownership of land and development rights as continued
investments in plots related to the underground provide future streams
of revenue to support ﬁnance and funding. In contrast, the sale of land
that beneﬁts from diﬀerential rent Ia impacts will transfer these gains to
the private sector, leaving the underground with reduced opportunities
to beneﬁt from LVC accruing from all three types of diﬀerential rent.
This restricts the contribution that LVC makes to the underground’s
business model, though some of the indirect beneﬁts that accrue from
public sector investment in infrastructure are captured by property and
land value-based taxes including business rates. It is critical that any
new line or extension to existing lines develops a proactive and long-
term approach to appropriating the plot-based impacts of public sector
infrastructural investments.
The experiences of LVC and ﬁnancialization in London and Hong
Kong not only reﬂect diﬀerent histories, institutional and governance
structures, but also diﬀerent approaches to capturing the value of in-
frastructure investment to support continued investment, development,
renewal and operations. While there are other transport and land use
policy and planning factors which have contributed to the ﬁnancial
sustainability of the underground railways in London and Hong Kong,
securing a sustainable ﬁnancial model is an essential step in ensuring
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that the risks related to multi-billion investment decisions of developing
major underground infrastructure, such as metros, are minimized for
the long-term beneﬁts of society.
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